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that manipulation is benecial to information aggregation when preferences and
abilities for manipulation are homogeneous, but detrimental in case abilities are
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Abstract
We investigate the role of manipulation in boundedly rational opinion dynamics. Agents
are subject to persuasion bias and repeatedly communicate with their neighbors in a social
network. They can exert eﬀort to manipulate trust in the opinions of others in their favor and
update their opinions about some issue of common interest by taking weighted averages of
neighbors’ opinions. We show that manipulation can connect a segregated society and thus
lead to mutual consensus. Second, we show that manipulation fosters opinion leadership; and
surprisingly agents with low trust in their own opinion might get more inﬂuential even by
being manipulated. Finally, comparative simulations reveal that manipulation is beneﬁcial to
information aggregation when preferences and abilities for manipulation are homogeneous,
but detrimental in case abilities are concentrated at few powerful agents.
Keywords: social networks, trust, manipulation, persuasion bias, opinion leadership, consensus,
misinformation
1 Introduction
Individuals often rely on social connections (friends, neighbors, and coworkers, as
well as political actors and news sources) to form beliefs or opinions on various
economic, political, or social issues. Every day individuals make decisions on the
basis of these beliefs and moreover, it is often desirable that others hold similar
beliefs as this would make them taking similar decisions. The latter is important
if individuals need the support of others to enforce their interests. In politics,
majorities are needed to pass laws, and in organizations, decisions might be taken by
a hierarchical superior or in a decentralized fashion. Hence, it may be advantageous
for individuals to increase their inﬂuence on others by manipulating the way they
form their beliefs.
This paper studies a model of opinion formation where agents are subject to
persuasion bias, i.e. fail to adjust for possible repetitions of information they receive
and instead treat all information as new, and can exert eﬀort to manipulate trust
in the opinions of others in their favor.1 We can see persuasion bias “as a simple,
1 In this light, we also model the incentives for manipulation in a boundedly rational way, meaning
that agents have a limited understanding of its consequences.
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boundedly rational heuristic for dealing with a very complicated inference problem.”
(DeMarzo et al., 2003) Correctly adjusting for repetitions of information would
become extremely complicated when individuals interact repeatedly on complex
social networks.2
To give some concrete examples for this setup, consider an organization where
decision making is decentralized, but decisions may have spillovers on other divisions.
If this is the case, then opinions of other division leaders on issues related to the
decisions are of importance as they will inﬂuence their decisions. And thus, leaders
have incentives to manipulate the way the others form these opinions in their
favor. Second, consider a network of policy-makers and lobbyists that hold opinions
on some policy issue and assume that the social network reﬂects the (subjective)
precisions of each agent’s initial information as in DeMarzo et al. (2003).3 Lobbyists
then have incentives to manipulate the social network of policy-makers to make the
latter implement policies in their favor, e.g. by convincing them of their (alleged)
expertise or by providing (alleged) credible arguments for their opinion; in this
context, we can view manipulation as persuasive or informational lobbying.4 And
more generally, we model manipulation as a persuasive activity that changes the
persuasion bias of the manipulated agent in favor of the manipulator.5
Our setup is based on the model developed by DeGroot (1974). Agents hold
opinions about some issue of common interest, are organized in a weighted social
network and repeatedly meet and communicate with their neighbors in the network.
We refer to the weighted and directed links from some agent to her neighbors as
her social trust. At each discrete time instance, ﬁrst one pair of agents is selected
by a stochastic process such that one of them has the opportunity to manipulate
the other one. The former can then decide whether or not to exert costly eﬀort
to manipulate the social trust of the other agent. If she decides to do so, this
increases the social trust of the manipulated agent in the manipulator, with the
magnitude of the increase depending on the manipulator’s ability to manipulate. The
manipulator’s decision depends on her preferences for manipulation. She faces a
trade-oﬀ between her personal gain from manipulation and its cost. Our model
covers a large class of possible reward functions to measure the personal gain from
manipulation of an agent, ranging from functions that depend only on current
opinions and the agent’s eﬀort to functions where agents can foresee how opinions
will change in the short-term. These are two possible extensions of persuasion
bias to manipulation: one where agents do not need to know the network (apart
from their own social trust), and one where agents do know the network, but are
nevertheless unable to adjust for repetitions of information.6 Agents might also have
2 We refer to DeMarzo et al. (2003) for a detailed discussion of this assumption, including references on
psychological evidence; for experimental evidence, see Choi et al. (2012); Chandrasekhar et al. (2012).
3 A lobbyist would be an agent that has high ability to manipulate policy-makers, while these would
have low (or no) ability to manipulate others.
4 Potters & Van Winden (1992) deﬁne persuasive or informational lobbying as “the use by interest
groups of their (alleged) expertise or private information on matters of importance for policy-makers
in an attempt to persuade them to implement particular policies.”
5 Notice that agents are not compensated for being manipulated. This means that, for instance, the
eﬀort of a lobbyist is understood as being related to providing, e.g. (alleged) credible arguments for
his opinion.
6 Notice that indeed, inferring where current opinions come from requires much more computational
ability than simply computing how an opinion will change in the short-term.
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more sophisticated reward functions if they are less subject to persuasion bias and
not manipulable themselves. Second, all agents communicate with their neighbors
and update their opinions according to their (possibly manipulated) social trust, i.e.
an agent’s updated opinion is a weighted average of her neighbors’ opinions (and
possibly her own opinion) from the previous time instance. Without incentives to
manipulate our model reverts to the standard DeGroot model of opinion formation.
We ﬁrst study segregated societies and show that manipulation can connect
segregated groups and thus make them reaching a consensus. In particular, an agent
outside these groups can serve as a mediator by manipulating members of both
groups, meaning that a mediator needs to have the ability to convince both groups
of his expertise or credibility on the issue. Second, we show that manipulation
fosters opinion leadership in the sense that the manipulating agent always increases
her inﬂuence on the long-run opinions and the emerging (partial) consensus. For
the other agents, the eﬀect of manipulation is ambiguous and, depending on
the social network, they might either gain or lose. In particular, we ﬁnd that,
surprisingly, agents with low trust in their own opinion might get more inﬂuential
even by being manipulated. To round oﬀ this part of the analysis, we establish
that under a weak minimum rationality requirement on the agents’ gain from
manipulation, manipulation eventually comes to an end. Finally, we investigate the
tension between information aggregation and spread of misinformation. We rely on
comparative simulations to obtain insights on the expected impact of manipulation
on information aggregation. The simulations reveal that manipulation is beneﬁcial
to information aggregation when preferences and abilities for manipulation are
homogeneous. This result turns out to be very robust with respect to changes in the
initial opinions and the social network; and it even holds when agents manipulate
without knowing the social network, basing their decision only on current opinions
and their eﬀort. The intuition for why this holds is that agents beneﬁt more from
manipulation when the manipulated agent is inﬂuential as in this case they indirectly
get more inﬂuential on many other agents. And thus, as the average inﬂuence of
the other agents in the society decreases in the agent’s own inﬂuence, agents beneﬁt
more from manipulation the lower their own inﬂuence. However, we also ﬁnd
that manipulation is detrimental to information aggregation in case abilities are
concentrated at few powerful agents; such agents, e.g. lobby organizations, might
severely harm information aggregation and spread their (potentially) misleading
information. Agents with higher ability beneﬁt more from manipulation and hence
increase their inﬂuence even if they were already rather inﬂuential before.
There is a large and growing literature on opinion formation in social networks,
either using a Bayesian perspective or some boundedly rational framework where
agents are subject to persuasion bias.7 We study a model of boundedly rational
opinion formation on a social network based on the seminal paper by DeGroot
(1974), see also DeMarzo et al. (2003), and Golub & Jackson (2010) for related
works. DeMarzo et al. (2003) show that persuasion bias implies the phenomena of
social inﬂuence and unidimensional opinions. Golub & Jackson (2010) study social
7 Acemoglu et al. (2011) develop a model of Bayesian learning on general social networks, and
Acemoglu & Ozdaglar (2011) provide an overview of recent research on opinion dynamics and
learning in social networks.
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learning under persuasion bias and ﬁnd that all opinions in a large society converge
to the truth if and only if the inﬂuence of the most inﬂuential agent vanishes as the
society grows.
Buechel et al. (2015) develop a model of opinion formation under persuasion
bias where agents may state an opinion that diﬀers from their true opinion
due to their preferences for conformity. They ﬁnd that lower conformity fosters
opinion leadership. In addition, the society becomes wiser if agents who are
well informed are less conform, while uninformed agents conform more with
their neighbors. Friedkin & Johnsen (1990) propose a variation where agents are
subject to persuasion bias but can adhere to their initial beliefs to some degree.
This leads to persistent disagreement among the agents in the long-run. And
similar results hold when assuming some kind of homophily, see, e.g. Axelrod
(1997); Hegselmann & Krause (2002); Deﬀuant et al. (2000). Acemoglu et al. (2010)
is related to Section 5 of our work as they investigate the tension between information
aggregation and spread of misinformation in a related model. They characterize
how the presence of forceful agents aﬀects information aggregation. Forceful agents
inﬂuence the beliefs of the other agents they meet, but only change very slowly
their own opinions. In our framework, these would be agents with very high trust in
their own opinion. They show that all beliefs converge to a stochastic consensus and
quantify the extent of misinformation by providing bounds on the gap between the
consensus value and the benchmark without forceful agents where there is eﬃcient
information aggregation. Friedkin (1991) studies measures to identify opinion leaders
under persuasion bias.
Furthermore, Watts (2014) studies the inﬂuence of social networks on correct
voting. Agents have beliefs about each candidate’s favorite policy and update their
beliefs based on the favorite policies of their neighbors and on whom the latter
support. She ﬁnds that political agreement in an agent’s neighborhood facilitates
correct voting, i.e. voting for the candidate whose favorite policy is closest to his
own favorite policy. Our paper is also related to the literature on lobbying as
costly signaling, e.g. Austen-Smith & Wright (1994); Esteban & Ray (2006). These
papers do not consider networks and model lobbying as providing one-shot costly
signals to decision-makers in order to inﬂuence a policy decision.8 To the best of
our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst allowing for the possibility to manipulate the social
network of other agents under persuasion bias.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the model of opinion
formation. In Section 3, we study segregated societies. Section 4 looks at the long-run
eﬀects of manipulation. In Section 5, we investigate how manipulation aﬀects the
extent of misinformation in society. Section 6 concludes. The proofs are presented
in the appendix.
2 Model and notation
We consider a set N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, n  2, of agents who repeatedly communicate
with their neighbors in a social network. Each agent i ∈ N has an initial opinion
8 Notice that we study how (repeated) manipulation and lobbying aﬀect public opinion (and potentially
single decision-makers) in the long-run, but do not model explicitly any decision-making process.
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or belief xi(0) ∈  about some issue of common interest and an initial vector of
social trust mi(0) = (mi1(0), mi2(0), . . . , min(0)), with 0  mij(0)  1 for all j ∈ N and∑
j∈N mij(0) = 1, that captures how much attention agent i initially pays to each
of the other agents. More precisely, mij(0) is the initial weight or trust that agent i
places on the current opinion of agent j in forming her updated belief. We assume
that mii(0) > 0 for all i ∈ N, which can be interpreted as each agent having some
trust in her own initial opinion.9 At time instance t = 0, 1, 2, . . ., the agents’ beliefs
are represented by the vector x(t) = (xi(t))i∈N and their social trust by the matrix
M(t) = (mij(t))i,j∈N. Furthermore, let αij  0 denote agent i’s ability to manipulate
with respect to agent j.10
First, one agent is chosen randomly (probability 1/n for each agent) to meet and
to have the opportunity to manipulate another agent. If agent i ∈ N is chosen at
time t, she meets agent j ∈ N with probability αij/(∑k =i αik) and can decide on
the eﬀort α ∈ {0, αij} she would like to exert on j, and no meeting takes place if∑
k =i αik = 0.11 We write Γ(t) = (i, j; α) when agent i is chosen to manipulate agent
j at time t and decides to exert eﬀort α on j. The decision of agent i leads to the
following updated trust weights of agent j:
mjk(t+ 1) =
{
mjk(t)/ (1 + α) if k = i(
mjk(t) + α
)
/ (1 + α) if k = i
.
The trust of j in i is increasing in the eﬀort of agent i and all trust weights of j are
normalized.12 Notice that this normalization implies that the trust of j in an agent
other than i decreases by the factor 1/(1 + α), i.e. the absolute decrease in trust is
proportional to its level. If i decides not to manipulate (α = 0), the trust matrix
does not change. To emphasize that the resulting updated trust matrix M(t + 1) is
derived by applying the manipulation decision Γ(t) = (i, j; α) to M(t), we also write
[M(t)](i, j; α) instead of M(t+ 1). Agent i decides on whether or not to manipulate
agent j according to her utility function
ui
(
α | x(t),M(t), j) = vi(α | x(t),M(t), j)− ci(α | j),
where vi
(
α | x(t),M(t), j) is the (relative) reward for her eﬀort α ∈ {0, αij} and
ci(α | j) is its cost. We assume that for all j = i, ci(αij | j) > ci(0 | j) = 0 such that
eﬀort is costly. Notice that vi
(
αij | x(t),M(t), j)− vi(0 | x(t),M(t), j) measures agent
i’s gain from manipulation. Second, all agents communicate with their neighbors and
update their opinions using the updated trust weights, reﬂecting that they are subject
to persuasion bias and fail to adjust for possible repetitions of information:
x(t+ 1) = M(t+ 1)x(t) = [M(t)](i, j; α)x(t).
9 We impose this weak assumption as it guarantees convergence to consensus if the social network is
strongly connected, i.e. if there is a directed path between any two agents. Notice, however, that it
would suﬃce to assume aperiodicity of the initial trust matrix.
10 Notice that we can ﬁt the model to a situation of lobbying: take αij large for some i (the lobbyist)
and all j = i (policy-makers), while αjk ≈ 0 for j = i and all k = j.
11 To keep things simple, we assume that the meeting probabilities are equal to the relative abilities to
manipulate of the agents. Notice that we do not assume that agents choose an optimal eﬀort level
α∗ ∈ [0, αij ] as they are boundedly rational and as this would require high computational abilities
involving calculating derivatives.
12 This reﬂects that manipulation is a persuasive activity that changes the persuasion bias of the
manipulated agent in favor of the manipulator.
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We can rewrite this equation as x(t+ 1) = M(t+ 1)x(0), where M(t) := M(t)M(t −
1) · · ·M(1) denotes the overall trust matrix. Now, let us give some examples of reward
functions.
Example 1 (Reward functions)
Consider the function
i.
vi
(
α | x(t),M(t), j) = − 1
n − 1
∑
k =i
(
xi(t) − xk(t+ 1)
)2
,
where xk(t+ 1) =
(
[M(t)](i, j; α)x(t)
)
k
. Agent i’s objective is to bring the other
agents’ updated opinions as close as possible to her current opinion, weighting
equally the other agents and disregarding that her own opinion will change as
well.13 The latter represents that she is subject to persuasion bias.
ii.
vi
(
α | x(t),M(t), j) = −∑
k =i
mik(t)
(
xi(t) − xk(t+ 1)
)2
,
where xk(t + 1) =
(
[M(t)](i, j; α)x(t)
)
k
. Here, agent i’s objective is to bring
the updated opinions of agents she trusts as close as possible to her current
opinion, the importance of each agent being given by her trust weights.
iii.
vi
(
α | x(t),M(t), j) = α (xi(t) − xj(t))2 ,
a simple reward function that is independent of the trust matrix M(t) and thus
builds on the persuasion bias assumption. The product of the exerted eﬀort
and the squared distance between the two agents’ current opinions serves as a
boundedly rational proxy for the reward from manipulation. It seems natural
that, without knowledge of the network, agents manipulate those agents whose
opinions are far from their own opinion.
We will frequently use the ﬁrst reward function in examples, together with a cost
function ci(αij | j) = c for some constant c > 0. Our model reverts to the standard
DeGroot model without manipulation.
Remark 1
If we choose either constant reward functions vi ≡ v for all i ∈ N or manipulation
abilities αij = 0 for all i, j ∈ N, then agents have no incentives to or cannot
manipulate, respectively, and our model reverts to the standard model of DeGroot
(1974).
3 Segregated societies
In this section, we study segregated societies. We investigate how manipulation can
change segregated groups and, in particular, under which conditions it might lead
to a connected society. We ﬁrst shortly recall some graph-theoretic terminology. We
call a group of agents C ⊆ N minimal closed at time t if these agents only trust
13 For instance, consider an issue on which there will be a vote at some point. Then, the equal weights
represent that each opinion is equally important as each agent has one vote.
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agents inside the group, i.e.
∑
j∈C mij(t) = 1 for all i ∈ C , and if this property does
not hold for a proper subset C ′  C . The set of minimal closed groups at time
t is denoted by C(t) and is called the trust structure. The society is segregated at
time t if C(t) contains more than one group. Notice that agents in a minimal closed
group reach a consensus in the long-run conditional on that the trust matrix does
not change any more. A walk at time t of length K (from agent i1 to agent iK+1) is
a sequence of agents i1, i2, . . . , iK+1 such that mik,ik+1 (t) > 0 for all k = 1, 2, . . . , K . A
walk is a path if all agents are distinct. At each time t, we can decompose the set of
agents N into minimal closed groups and agents outside these groups, the rest of
the world, R(t):
N = ⋃
C∈C(t)
C ∪ R(t).
Within minimal closed groups, all agents interact indirectly with each other, i.e. there
is a path between any two agents.14 Moreover, notice that agent i ∈ N is part of
the rest of the world R(t) if and only if there is a path at time t from her to some
agent in a minimal closed group C  i. We say that a manipulation at time t does
not change the trust structure if C(t+ 1) = C(t), which implies that R(t+ 1) = R(t).
We ﬁnd that manipulation changes the trust structure when the manipulated
agent belongs to a minimal closed group and additionally the manipulating agent
does not belong to the same group. The group of the manipulated agent is either
disbanded or the manipulating agent (and possibly others) join the group.
Proposition 1
Suppose that at time t, Γ(t) = (i, j; αij), αij > 0.
i. Let i ∈ N, j ∈ R(t) or i, j ∈ C ∈ C(t). Then, the trust structure does not change.
ii. Let i ∈ C ∈ C(t) and j ∈ C ′ ∈ C(t)\{C}. Then, C ′ is disbanded, i.e. C(t+ 1) =
C(t)\{C ′}.
iii. Let i ∈ R(t) and j ∈ C ∈ C(t).
a. Suppose that there exists no path from i to k for any k ∈ ∪C ′∈C(t)\{C}C ′.
Then, R′ ∪ {i} joins C , i.e.
C(t+ 1) = C(t)\{C} ∪ {C ∪ R′ ∪ {i}},
where R′ = {l ∈ R(t)\{i} | there is a path from i to l}.
b. Suppose that there exists C ′ ∈ C(t)\{C} such that there exists a path
from i to some k ∈ C ′. Then, C is disbanded.
The proofs of this and other results can be found in Appendix A. Manipulation
of an agent in the rest of the world or within a minimal closed group (part (i))
does not change the trust structure as all groups remain closed. Second, if both
agents belong to diﬀerent groups, the one of the manipulated agent is disbanded
and its agents join the rest of the world as it is no longer closed after manipulation.
And third, if only the manipulated agent belongs to a minimal closed group, then
the eﬀect on the group of the manipulated agent depends on the trust matrix.
If the manipulating agent does not (indirectly) trust anyone in another minimal
14 Notice that minimal closed groups are also called strongly connected and closed groups, see
Golub & Jackson (2010).
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closed group, then she and possibly others join the group of the manipulated agent
(part (iii,a)), while otherwise her group is disbanded (part (iii,b)).15 The next remark
follows immediately from the fact that the society reaches a consensus if and only
if it is not segregated, i.e. there is a single minimal closed group.16 In particular,
it shows that an agent outside two segregated groups can serve as a mediator by
manipulating members of both groups.
Remark 2
Suppose that at time t, C(t) = {C,C ′} and R(t) = {k}. Society reaches a consensus
if either
i. agent i ∈ C(C ′) manipulates agent j ∈ C ′(C) at some time instance t′  t, or
ii. agent k manipulates agent k′ ∈ C at some time instance t′  t and agent
k′′ ∈ C ′ at some time instance t′′  t.
The ﬁrst part follows as one of the two minimal closed groups is disbanded
(Proposition 1 part (ii)) and thus there is only one group left. Similarly, if agent
k manipulates an agent in one of the groups, then she either joins the group
(Proposition 1 part (iii,a)) or it is disbanded (Proposition 1 part (iii,a)). In the ﬁrst
case, the other group will be disbanded after she has manipulated as well an agent
therein. Thus, one of the groups will be disbanded in any case as in the ﬁrst part.
The following example illustrates how manipulation can enable a society to reach a
consensus when there are two segregated groups and no rest of the world.
Example 2 (Consensus due to manipulation)
Consider N = {1, 2, 3} and
ui
(
α | x(t),M(t), j) = −1
2
∑
k =i
(
xi(t) − xk(t+ 1))2 − α
10
for all i ∈ N. Notice that the ﬁrst part of the utility is the reward function from
Example 1 part (i). Furthermore, the initial opinions and trust matrix are
x(0) =
⎛
⎝ 0.90.6
0.05
⎞
⎠ and M(0) =
⎛
⎝ 0.9 0.1 00.05 0.95 0
0 0 1
⎞
⎠
and αij = 0.2 is the ability of i to manipulate j, for all i = j. Notice that the agents
form two minimal closed groups: C(0) = {{1, 2}, {3}}. Without manipulation, agents
1 and 2 would thus reach a consensus, while the stubborn agent 3 would stick to
her initial opinion. However, with manipulation, the agents reach a consensus with
probability 1 (at least one of the agents 1 and 2 manipulates agent 3 or vice versa,
implying that one of the groups is disbanded). Figure 1 depicts one simulation run
15 We say that agent i indirectly trusts agent j (at time t) if there is a path (at time t) from i to j.
16 There is always at least one minimal closed group; agents in the rest of the world adopt the consensus
of this group.
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Fig. 1. Opinion dynamics in Example 2. The solid line represents agent 1, the dashed
line agent 2, and the dashed-dotted line agent 3.
of the long-run opinion dynamics, where17
Γ(t) =
⎧⎨
⎩
(3, 1; 0.2), t = 1, 4
(2, 3; 0.2), t = 5
(·, ·; 0), otherwise
.
The group of agent 1 is disbanded at time instance 1 due to the manipulation of
agent 3 (see part (ii) of Proposition 1). The last manipulation takes place at time
5, where agent 2 manipulates agent 3, meaning that agents 1 and 2 join the group
of agent 3 (see part (iii,a) of Proposition 1) such that they eventually form one
minimal closed group, C(6) = {N}, and reach a mutual consensus. This results in
the following ﬁnal trust matrix:
M(t) 
⎛
⎝0.625 0.069 0.3060.05 0.95 0
0 0.167 0.833
⎞
⎠ , t  6.
4 Long-run opinion dynamics
In this section, we investigate the long-run eﬀects of manipulation. First, we study the
consequences of a single manipulation on the long-run opinions of minimal closed
groups. In this context, we are interested in the role of manipulation in opinion
leadership. Second, we study the outcome of the inﬂuence process and illustrate our
results by means of an example.
4.1 Opinion leadership
Typically, an agent is called opinion leader if she has substantial inﬂuence on the
long-run beliefs of a group. That is, if she is among the most inﬂuential agents in the
17 The trajectories of the opinions can diﬀer substantially between runs as they depend on the order of
the agents’ meetings.
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group. Intuitively, manipulating others should increase inﬂuence on long-run beliefs
and thus foster opinion leadership. In what follows, we investigate this issue.
We denote by π(C; t) = (πi(C; t))i∈C the probability vector of the agents’ inﬂuence
on the ﬁnal consensus of their group C ∈ C(t) at time t, conditional on that the
trust matrix does not change any more.18 In this case, the group converges to the
consensus
x(∞) = π(C; t) x(t)|C =
∑
i∈C
πi(C; t)xi(t),
where x(t)|C = (xi(t))i∈C is the restriction of x(t) to agents in C . In other words,
πi(C; t), i ∈ C , is the inﬂuence weight of agent i’s opinion at time t, xi(t), on
the consensus of C . Notice that the inﬂuence vector π(C; t) depends on the trust
matrix M(t) and therefore changes with manipulation. A higher value of πi(C; t)
corresponds to more inﬂuence of agent i on the consensus. Each agent in a minimal
closed group has at least some inﬂuence on the consensus: πi(C; t) > 0 for all
i ∈ C .19
We restrict our analysis to the case where both the manipulating and the
manipulated agent are in the same minimal closed group. Since in this case the
trust structure is preserved (Proposition 1 part (i)), we can compare the inﬂuence
on the consensus of the group before and after manipulation. We show that
the manipulating agent always gains inﬂuence, which conﬁrms our intuition that
manipulation fosters opinion leadership. For any other agent, the change can be
positive or negative, implying that even the manipulated agent might gain inﬂuence.
Proposition 2
Suppose that at time t, Γ(t) = (i, j; α), i, j ∈ C . If α = αij > 0, then
i. agent i strictly increases her long-run inﬂuence, πi(C; t+ 1) > πi(C; t),
ii. any other agent k = i of the group can either gain or lose inﬂuence, depending
on the trust matrix,
iii. agent k = i, j loses inﬂuence for sure if j trusts solely her, i.e. mjk(t) = 1.
We refer to Appendix B for technical details and the proof of Proposition 2. For
agent i, the manipulator, the direct gain of inﬂuence (due to an increase of trust from
j) always dominates her indirect loss of inﬂuence (due to a decrease of trust from
j faced by agents that (indirectly) trust i). For agents k = i, j, there is a trade-oﬀ
between an indirect gain of inﬂuence (due to the increase of trust that i obtains
from j, but only in case i (indirectly) trusts k), on the one hand, and a direct loss of
inﬂuence (due to a decrease of trust from j) as well as an indirect loss of inﬂuence
(due to a decrease of trust from j faced by agents that (indirectly) trust k), on the
other hand. In the extreme case where j only trusts k, the direct loss of inﬂuence
dominates the indirect gain for sure.
Similarly, in case of the manipulated agent j, the trade-oﬀ is between an
indirect gain of inﬂuence (due to the increase of trust that i obtains from her,
but only if i (indirectly) trusts j), and an indirect loss of inﬂuence (due to a
decrease of trust from her faced by agents that (indirectly) trust her). In particular,
18 In the language of Markov chains, π(C; t) is known as the unique stationary distribution of the
communication class C .
19 See Golub & Jackson (2010).
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this means that, somehow surprisingly, even the manipulated agent j might gain
inﬂuence. In the following, we investigate this observation more closely. We show
that the manipulated agent gains from being manipulated in situations where the
manipulating agent trusts her signiﬁcantly and at the same time she does not have
much trust in her own opinion, i.e. if mij(t) is large and mjj(t) small.
Corollary 1
Suppose that at time t, Γ(t) = (i, j; α), i, j ∈ C , |C|  3 and α = αij > 0. Then, there
exists q(η) < 1 such that agent j gains inﬂuence from being manipulated if
i. mij(t) > q(η) and
ii. mjj(t) < (1 − η)/(3 − η) ·∑k∈C\{i,j} mjk(t),
where η := maxk∈C\{i,j} mkj(t).
The intuition behind this result is that an agent j that does not have much
trust in her own opinion (condition (ii)) basically gives it up immediately and
thus relies only on intermediaries to spread her opinion.20 In these circumstances,
agent j gains inﬂuence from being manipulated by an intermediary agent i that
trusts her signiﬁcantly (condition (i)). In a sense, the manipulated agent has trusted
the “wrong” agents before, i.e. agents k = i, j that did not trust her as much as
the manipulating agent i does. In particular, condition (ii) implies two necessary
conditions for that agent j gains inﬂuence from being manipulated: ﬁrst, j needs
to trust at least some agent k = i, j (as otherwise the right-hand side vanishes), and
second, mjj(t) < 1/4 (as η  0 and
∑
k∈C\{i,j} mjk(t)  1 − mjj(t)).
4.2 Convergence
We have already seen to which consensus value the agents converge to if no
more manipulation takes place. We now investigate this issue from an ex-ante
point of view. To ensure that manipulation decisions satisfy a minimum rationality
requirement, we consider the following assumptions on the reward functions of the
agents.
Assumption 1 (Minimum reward rationality)
A1. Agent i’s gain from manipulating agent j vanishes if the eﬀect of manipulation
on the updated opinions tends to zero, i.e.
vi
(
αij | x,M, j)− vi(0 | x,M, j) → 0 if ‖[M](i, j; αij)x − [M](i, j; 0)x‖ → 0,
where ‖·‖ is any norm on n.
A2. Agent i’s gain from manipulating agent j vanishes if their opinion diﬀerence
tends to zero, i.e.
vi
(
αij | x,M, j)− vi(0 | x,M, j) → 0 if |xi − xj | → 0.
20 Notice that for agents with high trust in their own opinion, their inﬂuence is partially due to the fact
that they spread it over time.
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The idea behind (A1) is that there should be no gain from manipulation without
manipulation aﬀecting the updated opinions. For (A2), the idea is that there should
be no gain from manipulation without the current opinions of the manipulator and
the manipulated agent being diﬀerent. Notice that the reward functions in Example
1 (i) and (ii) satisfy (A1) but not (A2) and vice versa for that in Example 1 (iii).
We ﬁrst show that the trust structure eventually settles down. Second, if all reward
functions satisfy either (A1) or (A2), manipulation within the minimal closed groups
that have ﬁnally been formed comes to an end. We also determine the ﬁnal consensus
opinion of each group.
Proposition 3
i. There exists an almost surely ﬁnite stopping time τ such that under the event
{τ = t}, we have C(t′) = C(t) for all t′  t.
ii. Take C ∈ C(t). If for all i ∈ C either (A1) or (A2) holds, then there exists an
almost surely ﬁnite stopping time bτ such that almost surely bτ  t and under
the event {bτ = t′′} agents in C are not manipulated from time t′′ on. Moreover,
they converge to the random variable
x(∞) = π(C;bτ) M(bτ − 1)|C M(bτ − 2)|C · · · M(1)|C x(0)|C .
Part (i) holds as the number of possible changes in the trust structure is bounded.
To understand why part (ii) holds, notice that when the trust structure has settled
down, the agents continue to approach a mutual consensus after each manipulation.
At some time t′′ (under the event {bτ = t′′}), the eﬀect of manipulation on the updated
opinions becomes small enough (the current opinions become close enough) such
that vi
(
αij | x(t′′),M(t′′), j) − vi(0 | x(t′′),M(t′′), j) < ci(αij | j), i.e. the gain from
manipulation is too small to outweigh its cost and thus agent i decides not to
manipulate j from time t on. And as this holds for any pair of agents (i, j) in C ,
manipulation comes to an end.
Denote by πi(C; t), the overall influence of agent i’s initial opinion on the
consensus of group C at time t conditional on that no more manipulation af-
fecting C takes place. The formula for the overall inﬂuence is implicitly given by
Proposition 3. In particular, it turns out that an agent outside a minimal closed
group that has ﬁnally been formed can never have any inﬂuence on its consensus
opinion.
Corollary 2
Under the event {τ = t}, the overall inﬂuence of the initial opinion of agent i ∈ N
on the consensus of the group C ∈ C(t) is given by the random variable
πi(C;bτ) =
{ (
π(C;bτ) M(bτ − 1)|C M(bτ − 2)|C · · · M(1)|C
)
i
if i ∈ C
0 if i /∈ C ,
where τ andbτ are as deﬁned in Proposition 3.
4.3 Three-agents example
Finally, let us consider an example to illustrate the results of this section. We use a
utility model based on the reward function in Example 1 (i).
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Fig. 2. Opinion dynamics (top), and the corresponding inﬂuence (middle), and overall
inﬂuence (bottom) of the agents in Example 3. The solid line represents agent 1, the
dashed line agent 2, and the dashed-dotted line agent 3.
Example 3 (Three-agents society)
Consider N = {1, 2, 3} and
ui
(
α | x(t),M(t), j) = −1
2
∑
k =i
(
xi(t) − xk(t+ 1))2 − α
20
for all i ∈ N. Furthermore, the initial opinions and trust matrix are
x(0) =
⎛
⎝0.950.7
0.05
⎞
⎠ and M(0) =
⎛
⎝0.95 0.05 00.05 0.92 0.03
0.05 0.05 0.9
⎞
⎠
and αij = 0.2 is the ability of i to manipulate j, for all i = j. Notice that the agents
form one minimal closed group. The vector of initial inﬂuence and overall inﬂuence,
which is also the vector of inﬂuence in the DeGroot model without manipulation
(denoted by πDG), is π(N; 0) = π(N; 0) = πDG  (0.5, 0.385, 0.115). Thus, without
manipulation, the agents would reach the consensus xDG(∞) = πDG · x(0)  0.75.
The inﬂuence weights and hence the consensus the agents reach might change
signiﬁcantly with manipulation. Figure 2 depicts one simulation run of the long-run
Trust and manipulation in social networks 229
opinion dynamics and the corresponding inﬂuence and overall inﬂuence of the
agents, where
Γ(t) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(3, 2; 0.2), t = 0
(2, 3; 0.2), t = 1
(1, 3; 0.2), t = 2
(2, 1; 0.2), t = 4
(·, ·; 0), otherwise
.
Notice that although the last manipulation makes agent 2 the most inﬂuential agent
from time 5 on, agent 1 stays the most inﬂuential agent in terms of the initial
opinions. By the time agent 2 manipulates agent 1, the initial opinion of the latter
agent has already spread in the network. This reﬂects the intuition that manipulation
has the most bite in the beginning, before potentially misleading opinions (in this
case agent 1’s opinion) have spread. This results in the following ﬁnal trust matrix:
M(t) 
⎛
⎝0.792 0.208 00.042 0.767 0.192
0.201 0.174 0.625
⎞
⎠ , t  5.
The agents reach the consensus x(∞)  0.623, which reﬂects the gain of overall
inﬂuence of agent 3 (and the loss of the other agents) as the consensus value is
closer to agent 3’s initial opinion compared to the case without manipulation.
5 Spread of (mis)information
In this section, we investigate how manipulation aﬀects the aggregation of informa-
tion and the spread of misinformation in society. First, we study conditions under
which a single manipulation is beneﬁcial for information aggregation. Second, we
rely on comparative simulations to obtain insights on the long-run consequences of
manipulation on information aggregation and the spread of misinformation.
We assume that the society forms one minimal closed group as segregated societies
clearly fail to aggregate dispersed information.21 We use an approach similar to
Acemoglu et al. (2010) and assume that there is an underlying state μ = 1/n ·∑
i∈N xi(0) that corresponds to the average of the initial opinions of the n agents.
Information about the underlying state is dispersed, but can easily be aggregated
by the agents: uniform overall inﬂuence on the long-run beliefs leads to perfect
aggregation of information.22 We measure the spread of misinformation in society
at time t by the gap between the consensus reached conditional on that no more
manipulation takes place and the underlying state:
π(N; t)x(0) − μ =∑
i∈N
(
πi(N; t) − 1
n
)
xi(0).
Thus, we can quantify the extent of the spread of misinformation by looking at the
deviations of the overall inﬂuences from the average inﬂuence in society.
21 Nevertheless, manipulation that leads to a connected society as in Example 2 can be interpreted as
improving information aggregation.
22 We could also think of the initial opinions as being drawn independently from some distribution with
mean μ. Then, uniform overall inﬂuence would lead as well to optimal aggregation, the diﬀerence being
that it would not be perfect due to the ﬁnite number of samples drawn by the agents. Furthermore,
notice that the agents do not have any objectives regarding the underlying state.
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Definition 1 (Extent of misinformation)
i. The extent of misinformation in society at time t is
‖π(N; t) − 1/n · ‖2,
where  = (1, 1, . . . , 1) ∈ n is a vector of 1s and ‖x‖2 =
√∑
k∈N |xk|2 the
standard Euclidean norm of x ∈ n,
ii. manipulation at time t decreases (increases) the extent of misinformation in
society if
‖π(N; t+ 1) − 1/n · ‖2 < (>)‖π(N; t) − 1/n · ‖2, and
iii. manipulation at time t strongly decreases (strongly increases) the extent of
misinformation in society if
|πi(N; t+ 1) − 1/n| < (>)|πi(N; t) − 1/n| for all i ∈ N.
Notice that the above measure is also useful in other situations. If the issue at stake
is, for instance, normative, we can think of the extent of misinformation as a measure
for how egalitarian the society is in terms of inﬂuence; in this sense, the underlying
state reﬂects the consensus a fully egalitarian society would attain. The next result
provides conditions under which manipulation strongly decreases the extent of
misinformation in society. We show that ﬁrst, the ability of the manipulating agent
should be limited and second, agents with excess overall inﬂuence (πk(N; t) > 1/n)
should lose and others gain overall inﬂuence.
Proposition 4
Suppose that πk(N; t) = 1/n for all k ∈ N. Then, there exists α > 0 such that the
manipulation Γ(t) = (i, j; αij), αij > 0, strongly decreases the extent of misinformation
if
i. αij  α, and
ii.
∑n
l=1 mlk(t)
(
πl(N; t + 1) − πl(N; t)) < (>) 0 for k ∈ N such that πk(N; t) >
(<) 1/n.
Intuitively, condition (ii) says that agents whose current overall inﬂuence is above
the average inﬂuence in society (πk(N; t) > 1/n) should lose overall inﬂuence
due to the manipulation and agents whose current overall inﬂuence is below
the average inﬂuence (πk(N; t) < 1/n) should gain. Then, this leads to a strong
reduction of the extent of misinformation if i’s ability to manipulate j is below some
threshold (condition (i)). Otherwise, manipulation makes some agents too inﬂuential,
in particular the manipulating agent, and might lead to an increase of the extent of
misinformation.
5.1 Comparative simulations
Example 3 indicates that when preferences for manipulation and abilities to ma-
nipulate are homogeneous, then manipulation might overall—i.e. in terms of the
overall inﬂuences after the last manipulation has taken place—decrease the extent
of misinformation.23 In the following, we conduct comparative simulations to further
23 Figure 2 depicts a simulation run where manipulation overall has strongly decreased the extent of
misinformation.
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investigate this observation. Doing comparative simulations is a risky business as
the resulting opinion dynamics may highly depend on the order in which the agents
manipulate in a particular simulation run and even more on the particular initial
opinion vectors and trust matrices we use. We therefore consider many diﬀerent
combinations of initial opinion vectors and trust matrices and also take the average
values over a large number of simulation runs to ensure that our results are
robust and precise approximations of the expected impact of manipulation. We
investigate environments with (1) homogeneous preferences and abilities, and (2)
homogeneous preferences but heterogeneous abilities. We conduct the simulations
for N = {1, 2, 3} and do R = 100, 000 simulation runs for each combination of
preferences and parameter values, which allows us to precisely approximate the
expected ﬁnal overall inﬂuences and the corresponding extent of misinformation.
These quantities indicate the tendency of the impact of manipulation in each of the
settings.
We start with homogeneous preferences and abilities for manipulation, i.e.
ui
(
α | x(t),M(t), j) = −1
2
∑
k =i
(
xi(t) − xk(t+ 1))2 − χ{α=0}(α) · 1
100
for all i ∈ N and αij = 0.2 for all i = j.24 We consider all permutations of the initial
opinion vectors
x(0) =
⎛
⎝0.90.7
0.1
⎞
⎠ and x(0) =
⎛
⎝0.90.5
0.1
⎞
⎠ .25
The initial trust matrix in the basic setting (1) is
M(0) = M(1) =
⎛
⎝0.95 0.05 00.05 0.92 0.03
0.05 0.05 0.9
⎞
⎠ .
To test how the impact of manipulation depends on the initial trust matrix, we
consider modiﬁcations of M(1). We increase one (or two) trust weight(s) mij(0), i = j,
by 0.1 (0.05 each), and decrease the corresponding weight mii(0) accordingly. Thus,
we run simulations with the initial trust matrix M(1) and the following modiﬁcations:
M(2) =
⎛
⎝0.85 0.15 00.05 0.92 0.03
0.05 0.05 0.9
⎞
⎠ ,M(3) =
⎛
⎝0.85 0.05 0.10.05 0.92 0.03
0.05 0.05 0.9
⎞
⎠ ,
24 χ{α=0}(α) = { 1, if α = 00, otherwise denotes the characteristic function of the set {α = 0}.
25 Notice that only the absolute diﬀerences of each pair of opinions matter for the agents’ preferences.
Thus, we implicitly also cover permutations of the vector
(
0.9
0.3
0.1
)
as, e.g. the opinion dynamics with
this vector of initial opinions is equivalent in terms of manipulations to the one with initial opinions(
0.1
0.7
0.9
)
. And we also cover permutations of vectors
(
0.9 + h
0.7 + h
0.1 + h
)
, h ∈ .
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M(4) =
⎛
⎝0.95 0.05 00.15 0.82 0.03
0.05 0.05 0.9
⎞
⎠ ,M(5) =
⎛
⎝0.95 0.05 00.05 0.82 0.13
0.05 0.05 0.9
⎞
⎠ ,
M(6) =
⎛
⎝0.95 0.05 00.05 0.92 0.03
0.15 0.05 0.8
⎞
⎠ ,M(7) =
⎛
⎝0.95 0.05 00.05 0.92 0.03
0.05 0.15 0.8
⎞
⎠ ,
M(8) =
⎛
⎝0.85 0.1 0.050.05 0.92 0.03
0.05 0.05 0.9
⎞
⎠ ,M(9) =
⎛
⎝0.95 0.05 00.1 0.82 0.08
0.05 0.05 0.9
⎞
⎠ ,
M(10) =
⎛
⎝0.95 0.05 00.05 0.92 0.03
0.1 0.1 0.8
⎞
⎠ ,M(11) =
⎛
⎝ 0.9 0.05 0.050.05 0.87 0.08
0.05 0.05 0.9
⎞
⎠ ,
M(12) =
⎛
⎝ 0.9 0.1 00.05 0.92 0.03
0.05 0.1 0.85
⎞
⎠ ,M(13) =
⎛
⎝0.95 0.05 00.1 0.87 0.03
0.1 0.05 0.85
⎞
⎠ .
For a given combination of initial opinion vector and trust matrix deﬁned above,
the extent of misinformation corresponding to the mean ﬁnal overall inﬂuences
is given by ‖π∗,mean − 1/3 · ‖2, where π∗,meani = 1/R ·
∑R
r=1 π
∗,r
i denotes the mean
ﬁnal overall inﬂuence of agent i and π∗,ri the ﬁnal overall inﬂuence of agent i in
run r, i.e. the overall inﬂuence of agent i in run r after the last manipulation has
taken place. The results of the simulations in terms of the extents of misinformation
corresponding to the mean ﬁnal overall inﬂuences are presented in Table 1.
The results show that, in expectation, manipulation decreases the ﬁnal extent
of misinformation for all combinations of initial opinions and trust matrices; and
moreover, the decrease is strong for most combinations.26 In particular, it is striking
that this is even the case in settings (3) and (11), where the extent of misinformation
is already rather small ex-ante. We have also conducted a robustness check with
the reward function from Example 1 (iii) to see whether these results depend on
the fact that the agents need to know the social network. The results were almost
identical,27 which conﬁrms that manipulation, in expectation, decreases the extent of
misinformation when preferences and abilities for manipulation are homogeneous.
And in particular, this even holds when agents only take into account their ability
and current opinions for their decisions and do not know the social network.
The intuition for this ﬁnding is that given a certain ability to manipulate, the
beneﬁt from manipulation depends mainly on the inﬂuence of the manipulated
agent. If the latter is inﬂuential, then the manipulator beneﬁts a lot and gains
substantially in inﬂuence, while she does not beneﬁt much otherwise. The reason
is that manipulating an inﬂuential agent makes the manipulator indirectly more
inﬂuential on many other agents. Furthermore, notice that the higher an agent’s
inﬂuence, the lower the average inﬂuence of the other agents in the society. Therefore,
26 Notice that π
(11)
1 (N; 0) = π(12)1 (N; 0) = 1/3 and thus a strong decrease of the extent of misinformation
is not possible in settings (11) and (12).
27 The ﬁnal extent of misinformation decreased for all combinations of initial opinions and trust matrices,
and strongly decreased for most combinations.
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Table 1. Simulation results with homogeneous preferences and abilities in terms of the extents of misinformation corresponding to the mean ﬁnal overall
inﬂuences. ∗ indicates a decrease and ∗∗ a strong decrease compared to the DeGroot model without manipulation.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
0.9, 0.7, 0.1 0.11∗∗ 0.19∗∗ 0.07∗∗ 0.24∗∗ 0.17∗ 0.23∗∗ 0.2∗∗ 0.12∗∗ 0.18∗∗ 0.21∗∗ 0.06∗ 0.19∗ 0.25∗
0.9, 0.5, 0.1 0.1∗∗ 0.16∗∗ 0.06∗∗ 0.19∗∗ 0.11∗∗ 0.21∗∗ 0.2∗ 0.1∗∗ 0.14∗∗ 0.2∗∗ 0.05∗ 0.18∗ 0.2∗∗
0.1, 0.7, 0.9 0.11∗∗ 0.2∗∗ 0.06∗∗ 0.18∗∗ 0.12∗∗ 0.23∗ 0.24∗ 0.12∗∗ 0.14∗∗ 0.23∗ 0.07∗ 0.23∗ 0.21∗∗
0.9, 0.1, 0.7 0.2∗∗ 0.16∗∗ 0.08∗ 0.34∗∗ 0.14∗∗ 0.3∗∗ 0.28∗∗ 0.09∗∗ 0.23∗∗ 0.28∗∗ 0.05∗ 0.21∗ 0.32∗∗
0.9, 0.1, 0.5 0.13∗∗ 0.18∗∗ 0.06∗∗ 0.23∗∗ 0.1∗∗ 0.24∗∗ 0.22∗∗ 0.1∗∗ 0.15∗∗ 0.22∗∗ 0.04∗ 0.2∗ 0.24∗∗
0.1, 0.9, 0.7 0.14∗ 0.23∗∗ 0.07∗∗ 0.2∗∗ 0.11∗∗ 0.26∗ 0.25∗ 0.13∗∗ 0.14∗∗ 0.25∗ 0.06∗ 0.25∗ 0.23∗∗
0.7, 0.9, 0.1 0.13∗∗ 0.19∗ 0.08∗∗ 0.26∗∗ 0.14∗∗ 0.25∗∗ 0.21∗∗ 0.13∗∗ 0.2∗∗ 0.22∗∗ 0.04∗ 0.19∗ 0.26∗
0.5, 0.9, 0.1 0.12∗∗ 0.14∗∗ 0.07∗∗ 0.24∗∗ 0.13∗∗ 0.23∗∗ 0.21∗∗ 0.1∗∗ 0.17∗∗ 0.22∗∗ 0.04∗ 0.17∗ 0.26∗∗
0.7, 0.1, 0.9 0.18∗∗ 0.14∗ 0.09∗ 0.32∗∗ 0.14∗∗ 0.3∗∗ 0.26∗∗ 0.1∗∗ 0.23∗∗ 0.28∗∗ 0.05∗ 0.16∗ 0.32∗∗
DeGroot 0.28 0.3 0.1 0.48 0.21 0.36 0.33 0.18 0.34 0.34 0.08 0.31 0.44
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Table 2. Simulation results with homogeneous preferences and heterogeneous abilities in
terms of the mean ﬁnal overall inﬂuences and the corresponding extents of misinformation.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) DeGroot
π
∗,mean
1 0.337 0.375 0.374 0.41 0.438 0.264 0.299 0.287 1/3
π
∗,mean
2 0.325 0.263 0.362 0.291 0.282 0.37 0.402 0.425 1/3
π
∗,mean
3 0.338 0.362 0.264 0.299 0.281 0.365 0.299 0.288 1/3
‖π∗,mean − 1/3 · ‖2 0.01 0.087 0.085 0.094 0.128 0.084 0.084 0.112 0
in expectation, agents beneﬁt more from manipulation the lower their own inﬂuence
and thus manipulation decreases the extent of misinformation.
Second, we conduct simulations with heterogeneous abilities for manipulation.
Therefore, we take an otherwise symmetric environment where preferences are
ui
(
α | x(t),M(t), j) = −1
2
∑
k =i
(
xi(t) − xk(t+ 1))2 − χ{α=0}(α) · 1
100
for all i ∈ N and initial opinions and initial trust matrix are given by
x(0) =
⎛
⎝0.90.5
0.1
⎞
⎠ and M(0) =
⎛
⎝ 0.9 0.05 0.050.05 0.9 0.05
0.05 0.05 0.9
⎞
⎠ .
The vector of initial overall inﬂuence is π(N; 0) = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3). Notice that the
agents are not perfectly symmetric in the distance between their initial opinions and
thus we can only treat agents 1 and 3 as equivalent. The abilities to manipulate in
the basic setting (1) are given by α(1)ij = 0.2 for all i = j. To test how the impact of
manipulation depends on the abilities, we increase ﬁrst one ability of agent 1 by 0.4,
and then both abilities by 0.4 as well as by 1; and the same is done for agent 2. Thus,
we run simulations with the abilities α(1)ij and the following modiﬁcations (abilities
that do not change are omitted):28
α
(2)
12 = 0.6; α
(3)
13 = 0.6; α
(4)
12 = α
(4)
13 = 0.6; α
(5)
12 = α
(5)
13 = 1.2;
α
(6)
21 = 0.6; α
(7)
21 = α
(7)
23 = 0.6; α
(8)
21 = α
(8)
23 = 1.2.
The results of the simulations in terms of the mean ﬁnal overall inﬂuences are
presented in Table 2.29
Settings (2) and (3) show that increasing one ability by 0.4 already beneﬁts agent
1 signiﬁcantly in expectation, while the agent more susceptible to manipulation
loses inﬂuence. Notice that the agent not concerned by the change in ability also
signiﬁcantly gains inﬂuence in expectation. Increasing both abilities by 0.4 (setting
(4)) and by 1 (setting (5)) further increases the gain of inﬂuence of agent 1,
while the other agents lose equally. Moreover, we also ﬁnd that the extent of
misinformation signiﬁcantly increases in expectation when some agent gets more
ability to manipulate. The increase of both abilities from 0.2 to 1.2 has increased
28 We omit the case α
(6′)
23 = 0.6 as it is equivalent to α
(6)
21 = 0.6.
29 Notice that the diﬀerent mean ﬁnal overall inﬂuences in the basic setting (1) between agent 1 (agent 3)
and agent 2 are due to their asymmetry with respect to the initial opinions; and the slight diﬀerence
between agent 1 and agent 3 reﬂects the approximation error of our simulations.
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agent 1’s mean ﬁnal overall inﬂuence by around 30% and furthermore, it has
increased more than tenfold the extent of misinformation corresponding to the
mean ﬁnal overall inﬂuences. The tests with agent 2 (settings (6)–(8)) conﬁrm these
observations, the only diﬀerence being that the increase of inﬂuence is slightly
lower due to her weaker position in terms of initial opinions. Thus, our results
conﬁrm the intuition that agents that are more powerful than others in terms of the
abilities to manipulate, e.g. lobbyists or lobby organizations, might severely harm the
aggregation of information and spread their (potentially) misleading information.
Here, the tendency of the average beneﬁt from manipulation to decrease with
the agent’s own inﬂuence is dominated by the eﬀect coming from the asymmetry in
abilities. Agents with higher ability to manipulate beneﬁt more from manipulation
and hence, in expectation, increase their inﬂuence even if they were already rather
inﬂuential before.
In total, our simulations suggest that manipulation is beneﬁcial to information
aggregation when preferences and abilities for manipulation are homogeneous, but
detrimental in case abilities are concentrated at few powerful agents.
6 Conclusion
This paper investigates a model of opinion formation where agents are subject to
persuasion bias, i.e. fail to adjust for possible repetitions of information they receive
and instead treat all information as new, and can exert eﬀort to manipulate trust in
the opinions of others in their favor. Our analysis is motivated by various examples
where it is desirable for individuals that others hold similar beliefs as this would
make them taking similar decisions.
Agents hold opinions about some issue of common interest, are organized in a
weighted social network and repeatedly meet and communicate with their neighbors
in the network. At each time instance, ﬁrst a pair of agents is selected by a stochastic
process such that one of them has the opportunity to manipulate the other, which is
modeled as changing the persuasion bias of the manipulated agent in favor of the
manipulator. Second, all agents communicate with their neighbors and update their
opinions according to their (possibly manipulated) social trust.
We ﬁrst study segregated societies and show that manipulation can connect
segregated groups and thus make them reaching a consensus. In particular, an
agent outside these groups can serve as a mediator by manipulating members
of both groups. Second, we investigate the long-run eﬀects of manipulation and
ﬁnd that it fosters opinion leadership; and surprisingly agents with low trust
in their own opinion might get more inﬂuential even by being manipulated.
Finally, we investigate the tension between information aggregation and spread of
misinformation. Our comparative simulations reveal that manipulation is beneﬁcial
to information aggregation when preferences and abilities for manipulation are
homogeneous. This result turns out to be very robust and even holds when agents
manipulate without knowing the social network. However, the simulations also show
that manipulation is detrimental to information aggregation in case abilities are
concentrated at few powerful agents; such agents, e.g. lobby organizations, might
severely harm information aggregation and spread their (potentially) misleading
information.
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We should notice at this point that manipulation how we model it has no bite
in large societies as studied by Golub & Jackson (2010). They study social learning
under persuasion bias and ﬁnd that all opinions in a large society converge to
the truth if and only if the inﬂuence of the most inﬂuential agent vanishes as the
society grows. In large societies, manipulation does not change convergence to the
underlying state since its consequences are negligible compared to the size of society.
However, our intuition is that an agent being able to manipulate a substantial
proportion of the society could spread misinformation also in large societies.
We view our paper as a ﬁrst attempt in studying manipulation and spread of
(mis)information in social networks. Our approach incorporates boundedly rational
decision making in a model where agents are subject to persuasion bias. We made
several simplifying assumptions and derived results that apply to general societies.
One line of future investigation is to relax the restriction to manipulation of a single
agent. Extending manipulation to groups is interesting in particular in the context
of large societies as studied by Golub & Jackson (2010). Second, it is important to
study manipulation when agents are, at least partly, Bayesian. While our boundedly
rational approach is a natural starting point as the notion of manipulation is
more diﬃcult to introduce into a Bayesian setup, it would be interesting to study
manipulation with rational agents.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
i. Follows immediately since all minimal closed groups remain unchanged.
ii. If agent i manipulates agent j, then mji(t + 1) > 0 and thus, since C
′  j
is minimal closed at time t, there exists a path at t + 1 from l to i for all
l ∈ C ′. Since C is still minimal closed, it follows that R(t+ 1) = R(t) ∪ C ′, i.e.
C(t+ 1) = C(t)\{C ′}.
iii. a. If agent i manipulates agent j, then it follows that
∑
l∈C∪{i} mkl(t+ 1) = 1
for all k ∈ C since C is closed at time t. Furthermore, since by assumption
there is no path from i to k for any k ∈ ∪C ′∈C(t)\{C}C ′ and by deﬁnition
of R′,
∑
l∈C∪R′∪{i} mkl(t + 1) = 1 for all k ∈ R′ ∪ {i}. Hence, it follows that∑
l∈C∪R′∪{i} mkl(t+ 1) = 1 for all k ∈ C ∪ R′ ∪ {i}, i.e. C ∪ R′ ∪ {i} is closed.
Moreover, since by assumption there is no path from i to k for any
k ∈ ∪C ′∈C(t)\{C}C ′, there is a path from i to j (otherwise R′ ∪ {i} was closed
at t). Thus, since C is minimal closed and i manipulates j, there is a path
from k to l for all k, l ∈ C ∪ {i} at t + 1. Then, by deﬁnition of R′, there
is also a path from k to l for all k ∈ C ∪ {i} and l ∈ R′. Moreover, again
by assumption and deﬁnition of R′, there exists a path from k to l for all
k ∈ R′ and all l ∈ C (otherwise a subset of R′ was closed at t).
Combined, this implies that the same holds for all k, l ∈ C∪R′ ∪{i}. Hence,
C ∪ R′ ∪ {i} is minimal closed, i.e. C(t+ 1) = C(t)\{C} ∪ {C ∪ R′ ∪ {i}}.
238 M. Fo¨rster et al.
b. If agent i manipulates agent j, then mji(t + 1) > 0 and thus, since C  j
is minimal closed at time t, there exists a path at t + 1 from l to i for all
l ∈ C . Hence, by assumption there exists a path from agent j to k, but not
vice versa since C ′  k is minimal closed. Thus, R(t+ 1) = R(t) ∪ C , which
ﬁnishes the proof.
A.2 Proof of Corollary 1
First, it follows from Remarks 3 and 4 in Appendix B that for all k ∈ C\{i, j},
rkj(t) = 1 +
∑
l∈C\{j}
mkl(t)rlj(t)  1 +
∑
l∈C\{j}
mkl(t) =2 − mkj(t)
2 − max
u∈C\{i,j}
muj(t)
=2 − η > 1
since muu(t) > 0 for all u ∈ C\{i, j}. And as mij(t) → 1 implies rij(t) → 1, there exists
q(η) < 1 such that rij(t)  (3 − η)/2 if mij(t) > q(η).
Next, suppose that mij(t) > q(η) and mjj(t) < (1 − η)/(3 − η) ·∑k∈C\{i,j} mjk(t). It
follows that∑
k∈C\{i,j}
mjk(t)
(
rkj(t) − rij(t))︸ ︷︷ ︸
2−η−(3−η)/2=(1−η)/2

1 − η
2
∑
k∈C\{i,j}
mjk(t) >
3 − η
2
mjj(t)
 mjj(t)rij(t),
which by Proposition 2 part (ii) (the extended version in Appendix B) implies that
agent j gains inﬂuence and thus ﬁnishes the proof.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Suppose that the sequence (τk)
∞
k=1 of stopping times denotes the time instances where
the trust structure changes, i.e. under the event {τk = t} the trust structure changes
the kth time at time t. Notice that the event {τk = +∞} means that the kth change
never happens. By Proposition 1, it follows that under the event {τk = t < +∞},
either
a. 1  |C(t+ 1)| < |C(t)| and |R(t+ 1)| > |R(t)|, or
b. |C(t+ 1)| = |C(t)| and 0  |R(t+ 1)| < |R(t)|
holds. This implies that the maximal number of changes in the trust structure is
ﬁnite, i.e. there exists a positive integer K such that there are at most K changes in
the structure and thus, almost surely τK+1 = +∞. Hence, τ := max{τk+1 | τk < +∞},
where τ0 ≡ 0, is the desired almost surely ﬁnite stopping time, which ﬁnishes part
(i). Part (ii) follows from the following lemma.
Lemma 1
Suppose that C(0) = {N}. If for all i ∈ N either (A1) or (A2) holds, then there
exists an almost surely ﬁnite stopping time τ such that under the event {τ = t} no
more manipulation takes place from time t on. The society converges to the random
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variable
x(∞) = π(N; τ)M(τ − 1)x(0).30
Proof
By Proposition 1, we know that C(t) = {N} for all t  0. First, we show that the
opinions converge almost surely to a consensus x(∞). Therefore, suppose to the
contrary that the opinions do not converge almost surely, i.e. there exists a value
d > 0 such that maxi,j∈N|xi(t) − xj(t)| → d for t → ∞ with positive probability. In
this case, there exists t′ > 0 such that d  maxi,j∈N|xi(t)− xj(t)| < d+ ε for all t  t′
and some ε > 0. Furthermore, this implies that there exists a periodic trust matrix
M∗ ∈ n×n such that M(t) → M∗ for t → ∞.31 In particular, there are without loss
of generality 2  k  n agents i1, i2, . . . , ik such that m∗il il+1 = 1 for all l = 1, 2, . . . , k,
with k + 1 ≡ 1, and
d  max
l,l′∈{1,2,...,k}
|xil (t) − xil′ (t)| < d+ ε
for all t  t′. Next, take any agent il . As |mil il+1 (t′)−m∗il il+1 |  mil il (t′) > 0, there exists
0 < δ(mil (t
′)) < 1 such that if mil (t′) = mil (t′ + k), i.e. il is not manipulated during k
consecutive time instances, then
max
l′ ,l′′
|xil′ (t′ + k) − xil′′ (t′ + k)|  δ(mil (t′)) · maxl′ ,l′′ |xil′ (t
′) − xil′′ (t′)|,
which implies
max
l′ ,l′′
|xil′ (t′ + k) − xil′′ (t′ + k)| < δ(mil (t′)) · (d+ ε).32
Moreover, there exists an integer r∗ > 0 such that δ(mil (t′))r
∗ · (d + ε) < d, which
implies that
max
l′ ,l′′
|xil′ (t′ + r∗ · k) − xil′′ (t′ + r∗ · k)| < d
if il is not manipulated during r
∗ · k consecutive time instances. Hence, as the same
argument holds for all t′′ > t′, it follows that there exists an almost surely ﬁnite
stopping time τ′ such that under the event {τ′ = t} maxi,j∈N|xi(t) − xj(t)| < d, which
is a contradiction.
Having established the convergence of opinions, it follows immediately that
‖[M(t)](i, j; αij)x(t) − [M(t)](i, j; 0)x(t)‖ → 0 and |xi(t) − xj(t)| → 0, for t → ∞
and any pair of agents (i, j). Hence, as by assumption either (A1) or (A2) holds, we
get vi
(
αij | x(t),M(t), j) − vi(0 | x(t),M(t), j) → 0 < ci(αij | j) for t → ∞ and any
pair of agents (i, j), which shows that there exists an almost surely ﬁnite stopping
time τ such that under the event {τ = t}, there is no more manipulation from time
30 We deﬁne M(t) := In for t = 0,−1, where In is the n × n identity matrix.
31 The reason is that as the agents form a minimal closed group (which will not change due to
manipulation), they will fail to converge only in case the trust matrix converges to a periodic matrix.
Notice also that mii(0) > 0 implies mii(t) > 0 and thus M(t) = M∗ for all t  0.
32 Notice that δ(mil (t
′)) can be calculated by using a theoretical benchmark where all trust vectors
except that of agent il are equal to those in the periodic trust matrix and where no manipulation
takes place: set x˜(t′) := x(t′), emil := mil (t′), fmil′ := m
∗
il′ for all l
′ = l and x˜(t′ + k) := eMkx˜(t′). Then,
δ(mil (t
′)) := maxl′ ,l′′ |x˜il′ (t′+k)−x˜il′′ (t′+k)|/maxl′ ,l′′ |x˜il′ (t′)−x˜il′′ (t′)| < 1 as |emil il+1 −m∗il il+1 |  fmil il > 0.
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t on. Furthermore, agents reach a stochastic consensus that can be written as
x(∞) = π(N; τ)x(τ) = π(N; τ)M(τ)x(τ − 1)
= π(N; τ)M(τ − 1)M(τ − 2) · · ·M(1)x(0)
= π(N; τ)M(τ − 1)x(0),
where the second equality follows from the fact that π(N; τ) is a left eigenvector of
M(τ) corresponding to eigenvalue 1, which ﬁnishes the proof. 
Finally, notice that the restriction to C of the matrices M(·) in the computation of
the consensus belief is possible as C is minimal closed and thus M(·)|C are stochastic
matrices, which ﬁnishes the proof.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
First, we derive a formula for the absolute change of the overall inﬂuence weights
due to manipulation.
Lemma 2
For k ∈ N,
πk(N; t+ 1) − πk(N; t) =
n∑
l=1
mlk(t)
(
πl(N; t+ 1) − πl(N; t)).
Proof
It follows from Corollary 2 that
πk(N; t+ 1) =
n∑
l=1
mlk(t)πl(N; t+ 1)
=
n∑
l=1
mlk(t)
(
πl(N; t+ 1) − πl(N; t))+ n∑
l=1
mlk(t)πl(N; t)
=
n∑
l=1
mlk(t)
(
πl(N; t+ 1) − πl(N; t))+ n∑
l=1
mlk(t − 1)πl(N; t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=πk(N;t)
,
where the last equality follows since π(N; t) is a left eigenvector of M(t), which
ﬁnishes the proof. 
Next, let N∗ := {k ∈ N | πk(N; t) < 1/n} and N∗ := {k ∈ N | πk(N; t) > 1/n}.
Notice that N∗, N∗ = ∅. By Lemma 3 in Appendix B, we have πk(N; t + 1) −
πk(N; t) → 0 for αij → 0 and all k ∈ N and thus, by Lemma 2,
πk(N; t+ 1) − πk(N; t) → 0 for αij → 0 and all k ∈ N. (A1)
Let k ∈ N∗, then by (ii) and Lemma 2, πk(N; t + 1) > πk(N; t). Hence, by
Equation (A1), there exists α(k) > 0 such that
1/n  πk(N; t+ 1) > πk(N; t) for all 0 < αij  α(k).
Analogously, for k ∈ N∗, there exists α(k) > 0 such that
1/n  πk(N; t+ 1) < πk(N; t) for all 0 < αij  α(k).
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Therefore, setting α := mink∈N α(k), we have
|πk(N; t+ 1) − 1/n| < |πk(N; t) − 1/n|
for all k ∈ N and 0 < αij  α, which ﬁnishes the proof.
B Appendix – Derivation of Proposition 2
The proof of Proposition 2 relies on a measure for how remotely agents are located
from each other in the network, i.e. how directly agents trust other agents. This
measure is known as the mean first passage time in Markov chain theory. Let
(X(t)s )
∞
s=0 denote the homogeneous Markov chain induced by transition matrix M(t).
The agents are then interpreted as states of the Markov chain and the trust of i in
j, mij(t), is interpreted as the transition probability from state i to state j.
The mean first passage time from state i to state j is deﬁned as [inf{s  0 | X(t)s =
j} | X(t)0 = i]. Given the current state of the Markov chain is i, the mean ﬁrst passage
time to j is the expected time it takes for the chain to reach state j. In other words,
the mean ﬁrst passage time from i to j corresponds to the average (expected) length
of a random walk on the weighted network M(t) from i to j that takes each link
with probability equal to the assigned weight.33 This average length is small if the
weights along short paths from i to j are high, i.e. if agent i trusts agent j rather
directly. We therefore call this measure weighted remoteness of j from i.
Definition 2 (Weighted remoteness)
Take i, j ∈ N, i = j. The weighted remoteness at time t of agent j from agent i is
given by
rij(t) = [inf{s  0 | X(t)s = j} | X(t)0 = i],
where (X(t)s )
∞
s=0 is the homogeneous Markov chain induced by M(t).
The following remark shows that the weighted remoteness attains its minimum
when i trusts solely j.
Remark 3
Take i, j ∈ N, i = j.
i. rij(t)  1,
ii. rij(t) < +∞ if and only if there is a path from i to j, and, in particular, if
i, j ∈ C ∈ C(t), and
iii. rij(t) = 1 if and only if mij(t) = 1.
To provide some more intuition, let us look at an alternative (implicit) formula
for the weighted remoteness. Suppose that i, j ∈ C ∈ C(t) are two distinct agents in
a minimal closed group. By part (ii) of Remark 3, the weighted remoteness is ﬁnite
for all pairs of agents in that group. The unique walk from i to j with length 1 is
assigned weight (or has probability, when interpreted as a random walk) mij(t). And
the average length of walks to j that ﬁrst pass through k ∈ C\{j} is rkj(t) + 1, i.e.
33 More precisely, it is a random walk on the state space N that, if currently in state k, travels to state l
with probability mkl (t) . The length of this random walk to j is the time it takes for it to reach state j.
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walks from i to j with average length rkj(t)+1 are assigned weight (have probability)
mik(t). Thus,
rij(t) = mij(t) · 1 +
∑
k∈C\{j}
mik(t) · (rkj(t) + 1).
Finally, applying
∑
k∈C mik(t) = 1 leads to the following remark.
Remark 4
Take i, j ∈ C ∈ C(t), i = j. Then,
rij(t) = 1 +
∑
k∈C\{j}
mik(t)rkj(t).
Note that computing the weighted remoteness using this formula amounts to
solving a linear system of |C|(|C| − 1) equations, which has a unique solution. The
following lemma provides a formula for the absolute change of the inﬂuence weights.
Lemma 3
Suppose that at time t, Γ(t) = (i, j; α), i, j ∈ C . Then, the inﬂuence of agent k ∈ C
on the ﬁnal consensus of her group changes as follows:
πk(C; t+ 1) − πk(C; t) ={
α/(1 + α)πi(C; t)πj(C; t+ 1)
∑
l∈C\{i} mjl(t)rli(t) if k = i
α/(1 + α)πk(C; t)πj(C; t+ 1)
(∑
l∈C\{k} mjl(t)rlk(t) − rik(t)
)
if k = i .
Proof
Suppose without loss of generality that C(t) = {N}. We can write
M(t+ 1) = M(t) + ejz(t),
where ej is the jth unit vector, and
zk(t) =
{ (
mji(t) + α
)
/ (1 + α) − mji(t) if k = i(
mjk(t)
)
/ (1 + α) − mjk(t) if k = i
=
{
α(1 − mji(t))/ (1 + α) if k = i
−αmjk(t)/ (1 + α) if k = i .
From Hunter (2005), we get
πk(N; t+ 1) − πk(N; t) = −πk(N; t)πj(N; t+ 1)
∑
l =k
zl(t)rlk(t)
=
{
α/ (1 + α) πi(N; t)πj(N; t+ 1)∑l =i mjl(t)rli(t) if k = i
α/ (1 + α) πk(N; t)πj(N; t+ 1)
(∑
l =k mjl(t)rlk(t) − rik(t)
)
if k = i ,
which ﬁnishes the proof. 
Notice that the magnitude of the change in long-run inﬂuence increases with i’s
ability to manipulate j, and it is zero if i does not manipulate. We are now in the
position to prove the following result.
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Proposition 2
Suppose that at time t, Γ(t) = (i, j; α), i, j ∈ C . If α = αij > 0, then
i. agent i strictly increases her long-run inﬂuence, πi(C; t+ 1) > πi(C; t),
ii. any other agent k = i of the group can either gain or lose inﬂuence, depending
on the trust matrix. [In particular, she gains if and only if∑
l∈C\{k,i}
mjl(t)
(
rlk(t) − rik(t)) > mjk(t)rik(t), ]
iii. agent k = i, j loses inﬂuence for sure if j trusts solely her, i.e. mjk(t) = 1.
Proof
We know that πk(C; t), πk(C; t+1) > 0 for all k ∈ C . Furthermore, mjj(0) > 0 implies
mjj(t) > 0 and thus, by Remark 3,
∑
l∈C\{i} mjl(t)rli(t) > 0. Hence, πi(N; t + 1) >
πi(N; t), which proves part (i). Part (ii) is obvious. Part (iii) follows since mjk(t) = 1
implies
∑
l∈C\{k} mjl(t)rlk(t) = 0, which ﬁnishes the proof. 
